The divergence of private from social costs in rural-urban migration: a case study of Nairobi, Kenya by Collier, Valerie C. & Rempel, Henry
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribuiion-NonCommerciai-
NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.0rg/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
IDS/DP 181 
THE DIVERGENCE OF PRIVATE FROM SOCIAL 
COSTS IN RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION: 
A CASE STUDY OF NAIROBI, KENYA 
| - 7 AUG 1974 
By 
Valerie C. Collier and Henry Ren 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 181 
INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 
P.O. Box 30197 
NAIROBI, KENYA 
*The authors are respectively: Researcher, Cabinet Planning 
Secretariat, Province of Manitoba, and Assistant Professor, Department 
of Economics, University of Manitoba. The latter is also a Research 
Associate at the Institute for Development Studies, University of 
Nairobi. 
An earlier version of this paper was read at the Canadian 
Economics Association Meetings at Queen's University, Kingston in 
June, 1973. 
Views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. They should 
not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Institute for 
Development Studies or of the University of Nairobi. 
IDS/DP 181 
THE DIVERGENCE OF PRIVATE FROM SOCIAL COSTS IN RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION: 
A CASE STUDY OF NAIROBI, KENYA 
By 
Valerie C. Collier and Henry Rempel* 
ABSTRACT 
In Developing Economies the level of urban wages tends 
to induce more people to seek employment in the towns than can be 
employed at this wage level, f The existence of these urban unemployed 
causes the private costs of migration to diverge from the social 
costs..' The individual rural resident decides to remain or migrate 
on the basis of perceived private costs of migration. The effect 
of a decision to migrate on the economy is the social cost of 
migration. In our study we consider the determinants of different 
levels of private and social costs associated with different stocks 
of urban unemployed. In addition, utilizing survey data on Nairobi, 
Kenya, an attempt is made to quantify, the major private and social 
costs of migration to determine whether they diverge significantly. 
On the basis of these estimates some policy options for limiting 
urban unemp-loyment caused by urban in-migration are
INTRODUCTION 
In a survey of research on migration in Africa, Derek 
Byerlee suggests that it is likely that the private and social returns 
to migration diverge and he calls for research to determine the magnitude 
of this divergence (1, p.16), Our study is a partial response to this 
request. Data collected in a 196 8 survey (see Appendix) are used to 
measure the divergence of private from social costs of in-migration 
into Nairobi during the period 1964 to 1968. Such a limited study may 
arouse criticism from those who would wish a more balanced approach 
dealing with both costs and benefits. We would like to indicate at the 
outset that we are in no way implying that the costs outweigh the benefits 
of migration. ( We conclude with a discussion of policy issues which 
indicates ways of modifying the costs without jeopardizing the benefits. 
URBAN IN-MIGRATION AND URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
The general pattern of rural-urban income differentials in 
Kenya indicates a distinct monetary advantage for a typical rural 
resident who moves to a city or town and is successful In obtaining some 
form of employment. For the migrants in our sample the average rural-
urban income differential was 117 shs. per month, 182 per cent above 
average rural income. If the migrant was fortunate enough to find 
regular employment in the urban center during the first year after 
migration, the average differential increased to 147 shs. per month, 
a 230 per cent increase. This potential Improvement in cash income was 
purchased at the price of a rural-to-urban move and the cost of 
subsistence in an urban setting while participating in a lottery, 
"the urban economy game" (6, p.3). 
Given the magnitude of rural-urban wage differentials, the 
urban centers attract more migrants than can be employed at the prevailing 
urban wage. Therefore, there are at least two major forces at work 
which are determining in-migration: first, the positive influence of a 
large rural-urban wage differential which may be countered to some 
extent by the second, the migrant's perception of his ability to 
acquire a job. According to Todaro, the migrants consider the economic 
gains to be made from the rural-urban income differential but they also 
take into consideration the probability of obtaining urban employment 
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(22, p. 5). This probability varies directly with the urban rate of 
new employment creation and inversely with the ratio of urban job 
seekers to the number of existing urban job opportunities (Ibid. , 
p. 23). If real wages are increasing faster than unemployment, then 
the migrant's expected income may be the same or increase coincidentally 
with the rising numbers of unemployed. This may also occur when wages 
and job availability are increasing proportionately or the rate 
of job creation is faster than the increase in real wages. Therefore, at 
constant or rising urban real wages, the creation of one 
additional job in the urban sector results in more than one additional 
rural resident responding in the form of a rural to urban move. 
The existence of a significant rural-urban income 
differential creates a state of disequilibrium in the economy and 
emergence of large numbers of migrants is a response to this. 
Equilibrium is achieved and positive rural-urban migration checked 
when the level of urban unemployment leads to a marginal expected 
urban real income equal to the marginal rural real income. Thus 
this model is committed to an equilibrium situation in which 
significant levels of urban unemployment exist. The greater the 
differential between rural and urban wage levels, the larger the stock of 
urban unemployed needed to bring the rural-urban distribution of labour 
into equilibrium. As long as a rural-urban expected real income 
differential persists, the migrant can hope for a positive increase in 
his welfare as a result of migration. Society as a whole experiences 
the negative effects of high levels of urban unemployment. 
THE DIVERGENCE OF PRIVATE FROM SOCIAL COSTS IN RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION 
In practice, private costs cannot easily be distinguished from 
social costs. The approach here is first to estimate all those costs 
which the individual migrant incurs in his search for urban employment.1 
The costs to society of the rural-urban move include all of these private 
costs plus the costs associated with the urban unemployment caused by 
the inappropriate urban wage level relative to the rural income 
possibilities. In the sample, migrants into Nairobi were unemployed for 
an average of 3.5 months before obtaining their first job or before engaging 
2 in self-employment. In the second part of this section we estimate as 
1. Much of the empirical analysis in this section is taken from 
(3). 
2. A limitation of our survey is that we do not know how may men 
arrived in Nairobi between 1964 and 1968 but had left prior to the survey. 
The possible bias on our cost estimates of this limitation in the data is 
discussed later in the paper. 
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many of the social costs as possible based on 3,5 months of unemployment. 
Accurate measurement of the costs of migration would have required the 
use of socially optimal prices and wages, but for practical reasons 
measurement had to be based on observed average prices and wages. 
Finally, changes in private and social costs are correlated with changes in 
the size of the stock of urban unemployed and changes in the type of men 
who move into the towns. 
Private Costs 
(1) Average Rural Income Forgone: The first private cost to be 
considered is the income forgone by the migrant when he leaves his 
rural place of employment. This cost will be particularly significant to 
him before he acquires urban employment. In his decision-making process 
the migrant compares what he will give up — rural expected real income, 
with what he hopes to gain — urban expected real income, perceived in 
terms of the prevailing real wage rate and the probability of obtaining 
employment. If the difference between the two is sufficiently large, 
he will decide to move. 
Cash income in the rural areas was used as a measure of rural 
income forgone. In selecting the relevant value of cash income, we 
considered two factors. First, the length of unemployment after 
migration was related to the type of employment prior to migration. 
Those migrants who were either part-time employed or unemployed before they 
came to Nairobi wated the greatest average length of time for employment 
(4.5 to 5 months). The group which experienced only slightly less 
difficulty in obtaining urban employment was individuals who had been 
students before migration. The unemployed school-leavers embodied 16 
per cent of the total migrant sample while the previously part-time 
employed or unemployed who remained unemployed represented 3 per cent of the 
total migrant sample. 
Second, there were differences among the migrants in the 
realized levels of rural income. The men with a maximum of primary 
education averaged 62 shs. per month while the men with some secondary 
3 
education averaged 70 shs. The few who were wage-employed averaged 
3. All migrants who were students prior to migration were 
excluded in the calculation of these averages. 
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279 shs. per month while the self-employed averaged 53 shs., and 
average farm income was 2.3 shs. per month. 
Since these two factors had opposite effects, the length of 
unemployment is higher for the men with below-average rural income. For 
the average length of unemployment the figure 3.5 months was used and 
for the average rural income the figure 64 shs. per month was used. 
Therefore, on average each migrant paid 224 shs. in the form of rural 
income forgone to participate in the urban employment lottery. 
(2) Average Cost of the Move: The second private cost is the expense of 
the move itself and the cost of maintaining contact with the home area. 
Costs involved include actual travel expenses plus the psychological 
cost of being removed from family and friends. If a migrant has the 
possibility of making contact with friends and relatives in the urban 
center, then the psychological strain of estrangement may be decreased. 
We hypothesize that the greater the costs of the move, the larger the 
differential in expected income necessary to pull the migrant to the 
urban center. Other things equal, as the probability of obtaining 
urban employment declines, the people who are most distant in an economic 
and social sense are most likely to forgo a rural-to-urban move. 
The average distance travelled by the unemployed migrant 
sample was 114 miles. There are differences in the average distance 
travelled by the migrants who were unemployed for different lengths 
of time, but no consistent pattern emerges. It is the men who were 
unemployed for a maximum of three months and the men who were unemployed 
for more than a year who travelled above average distances. Since only 
a small proportion were unemployed longer than a year and since there is 
no obvious causal link between length of unemployment and distance 
travelled, the average of 114 miles is used. The approximate cost 
per mile of bus transportation is0.1 shs. so that the average cost of 
the moves per migrant is 11.4 shs. 
Unfortunately this measure does not indicate the total cost to 
the migrant. If the migrant Is accompanied by his wife, some of the 
psychological costs of the move are removed but monetary costs increase. 
In the total sample of unemployed migrants, 16 per cent of the men were 
accompanied by their wives, 63 per cent were single, and 21 per cent of 
the men were married but did not bring their wives with them. The 
psychological costs of the move can also be measured by the existence of 
family or relatives living in the urban center. When the migrants were 
asked why they chose to come to Nairobi, some did indicate they had come 
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because of the presence of friends or relatives. For the unemployed 
migrants in Nairobi, 75 per cent had obtained their information about 
Nairobi from relatives or friends who, we assume, are living in Nairobi. 
The migrants' second source of information regarding Nairobi was 
either family (67 per cent) or friends (17 per cent). From this 
evidence we might conclude that the psychological costs of the move 
are not as great as one might anticipate. However, it is impossible to 
quantify these costs. 
(3) Average Cost of Urban Subsistence and Job Search: The final 
private cost is the cost of subsistence and the cost of job search upon 
arrival in the urban center. To the extent that a person has savings or 
has others on whose resources he can draw to cover this cost, the greater 
will be the capability to risk a period of unemployment in order to 
obtain desired urban employment. If this cost can be passed on to 
others, it ceases to be a private cost except in the sense of the 
discomfort of cramped living and the obligations which must be repaid 
4 
at some future date. If the migrant cannot depend on either of these 
methods, he will need to resort to peri-legal activities such as beer-
brewing or traditional services such as operating a sidewalk shoeshine 
stand or, as a last resort, engage in begging. 
The additional cost of subsisting in Nairobi was not easy to 
estimate but we arrived at a figure based on the food and rental 
requirements of one migrant on a monthly basis. The Development Plan 
1970-74 states that for a family with an income of less than 199 shs, 
per month the upper limit to rental payment is 50 shs. per month 
(13, p. 508). Family size over our study period increased from 4.2 to 
4.6 persons (Ibid.); therefore, an approximate expenditure per person 
on rent is 10 shs. per month. It is possible to imagine that some of the 
migrants who cannot find shelter for themselves due to lack of money or 
friends would remove this cost by living out of doors (but anti-vagrancy 
laws make this difficult). 
The food necessary to keep a man alive was also difficult to 
estimate. The Statistical Abstract for 1968 gives the average amount 
spent on food for the middle income earners by household size 
(12, p. 174). For one person, expenditure for consumption of maize 
4. To the extent that assistance comes from family members with 
an expectation of repayment or subsequent assistance to other family 
members, it remains basically a private cost involving a transfer of 
income in kind. 
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and pulses equals 23 shs. per month We may safely assume that, 
although this constitutes a small fraction of the total food bill of the 
middle income earner, a man living at subsistence level in Nairobi 
would confine himself primarily to items such as these. The Central 
Province Survey of Urban Consumption concluded that food per household 
member costs 32 shs. per month (11, p. 65). From these figures we 
suggest that for a man to survive in Nairobi he must spend between 
'5 and 20 shs. on food per month. 
Additional cost for the unemployed is the cost of urban 
transit while job hunting, which .:-sts about 0.1 shs. per mile, and the 
cost of a newspaper, which is 0-5 shs. These two items will vary in arooun-, 
depending on the amount the migrant is able to sperd- He might nor be 
able to afford either; however, we will estimate tba he will spend on 
them a minimum of 4 shs . per month The average cost of subsistence a::d 
job search to the migrant for 3.5 months of unemployment will be '«5 shs. 
for shelter, 61 shs. for food and I1- shs. miscellaneous for a total, cost 
cf 11.0 shs. for a minimum standard of comfort. 
Whether these costs remain to be handled by the migrant or 
whether the unemployed are looked after by family ard _ ids will 
determine whether these costs are private or borne by society- The 
migranrs claim that 88 per- cent did receive assistance in the form of 
food and housing from others. Thus we are talking about 12 per cent of 
the unemployed and how they support themselves. Some unemployed 
migrants were receiving money from relatives living outside of Nairobi; 
however this amount was greatest in 196^ when they received on average 
0.3 shs. per month. Some unemployed men claimed they obtained miscellaneous 
income from unspecified sources, the mean value of which was 13 shs. 
per month. This explains how some of the unemployed suported themselves 
without the aid of family or friends. 
Social Costs 
(_) Average Urban Production Forgone: The first of the socia. costs 
is the urban production forgone during the time of the move and while the 
migrant searches for employment in the urban area. The exact value of 
this production forgone cannot be determined because the magnitude of 
the urban in-migration will affect the urban marginal product of labour. 
The maximum value of the production forgone by the typical migrant will 
be the current marginal product of the urban employed. The lower 
extreme, if large numbers migrate, will be the marginal product of the 
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rural employed. In our estimate of production forgone we provide a 
range of values based on these two extremes. In any case, the value of 
the urban production forgone is net of the rural production forgone 
by the migrant (see (1) under Private Costs). The value of urban production 
forgone will be a function of the migrant's education and job experience 
and will vary directly with the degree of urban unemployment. 
Fifty-six per cent of the migrants who experienced some 
unemployment had some primary education, 36 per cent had some secondary, 
and 8 per cent were without formal education. These figures are comparable 
to the distribution of the total sample of migrants (56, 33 and 11 per cent 
respectively). The average length of unemployment of the migrants in 
these education categories did not differ except for the migrants with 
no education, who waited an average of 5.5 months to obtain jobs. Of 
those who had qualifications other than a secondary certificate, few 
had any training which would enable them to work at skilled jobs. Of the 
147 who were unemployed in Nairobi, two had trade training and were 
unemployed from 13 to 15 months and one had a teaching certificate. This 
is also similar to the total sample of migrants and as a result we may 
conclude that those who were unemployed did not have inferior vocational 
training when compared to the total migrant sample. Young men were 
predominant in the sample of unemployed but made up 46 per cent of the 
total sample. The average length of time each wage group waited for a first 
job also emphasizes the significance of the younger men in the ranks of the 
unemployed. They average 5.9 months of unemployment compared to 3.5 
months for all migrants. 
Since the education and training differences between 
the unemployed and the total sample were slight, we concluded that the 
cost to the economy of the unemployed is not reduced due to any supposed 
inferiority on their part. The average income of the employed in the 
first quarter after migration was 266 shs. per month (primary - 155, 
secondary - 382, no education - 153). Therefore, for an average of 3.5 
months of unemployment, the estimated maximum cost to the economy due to 
unused manpower is 707 shs. per rural-urban migration (931 minus the 
average rural income forgone of 224 shs.). As stated earlier, if large 
numbers migrate, the marginal product of the employed urban worker will 
decline so that the above estimate represents a maximum net value of 
urban production forgone. The lower limit is the marginal productivity 
for the rural employed. For the men with some primary education, the 
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average rural wage was 150 shs. per month. For 3.5 months of 
unemployment the minimum value of net production forgone is 301 shs, 
(2) Average Cost of Urban Amenities: An additional social cost of 
the urban in-migrant Is the use of amenities essential to urban living. 
Unemployed migrants make demands on housing (net of reduced housing demand 
in the origin area), sewer, water, streets, electricity and some of the 
social amenities such as medical services and schools (net of what was 
available In the area of origin). This social cost per migrant varies 
directly with the degree of crowding In the use of existing amenities and 
the level of amenity provided. Any decision by government to alleviate 
the overcrowding in amenity use will create employment as well as 
greater amenity availability. Therefore, migration will be induced by 
the increased probability of obtaining employment. Further, for a 
given rural-urban expected real income differential, one might also 
argue that differences in the urban versus the rural standard of 
living may enter as an Inducement to migrate. 
cost which the city facilities must bear whether or not it is the migrant 
or his relatives who pay for it. Unfortunately we are not able to determin 
a value for this cost. The subject was studied according to the housing 
categories in which the migrants were living (3, chap. III). Those 
districts with the greatest numbers and proportions of unemployed 
migrants were: medium cost, medium density housing; low cost, high 
density housing; and temporary housing. 
were living with relatives who were earlier migrants to Nairobi. These 
migrants experienced short periods of unemployment before obtaining 
their first jobs ( 1 - 2 months). With relatively low density the use of 
government supplied facilities did not appear to be unduly heavy. 
The major social cost which these migrants imply is the influence they 
have on their hosts. Continual demands being made on a family in this 
housing category may have a discouraging consequence for the wage earner. 
5. The wage premium for secondary education Is considered to be 
negligible in the rural areas. 
The cost of providing urban amenities for the unemployed is a 
In medium cost housing the majority of unemployed migrants 
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In lew cost housing the average length of unemployment of its 
migrants was four months. The cost of these unemployed may be expected 
to be greatest of all the housing categories since much of the housing is 
government or employer subsidized. Also the high density conditions 
which exist here make the presence of unemployed individuals even more 
costly. Those migrants employed and living in these parts of Nairobi 
have incomes comparable to, and at times greater than, those living in 
medium cost. As a result, they are no less able to support their un-
employed relatives but the uncomfortable living conditions might have 
stronger psychological costs for the hosts. 
Temporary housing experienced the highest rates of unemployment— 
from 4 - 5 months per migrant. The costs of the unemployed in this 
category are reduced however since some facilities necessary in the heart 
of town, are not necessary out here, e.g.- sanitary and sewerage facilities 
may be kept down to a minimum relative to the demands made on low cost 
housing. Here families are in a much better position to help their 
relatives with potential for mutual benefit in self-help projects. 
Further costs to the economy were considered with regard to 
the marital status of the migrants and the permanency of residence. 
Sixty-three per cent of the men who did experience some unemployment were 
single, 16 per cent of the unemployed were accompanied by their wives to 
Nairobi, and, of this 1.6 per cent, seven men remained unemployed for at 
least two years. Those men who were married but unaccompanied by their 
wives made up 21 per cent of the migrants who had difficulty finding jobs 
upon arrival in Nairobi. Eighty-four per cent of the unemployed migrants, 
therefore, were no further burden on the city, The men whose wives came to 
Nairobi with them implied further costs to the municipality such as 
increased demands on health services, educational facilities, housing and 
related facilities, If the wife of the unemployed migrant is employed in 
the urban sector, the private costs and not the social costs are reduced. 
It has been proposed by Joan Nelson that the migrant's 
expectation of residential permanency will influence his demands on the 
urban center (18^, If the migrant plans to return to his village at 
some future date (regardless of the length of urban residence or the reality 
of his expectations), he will not have the same attitude towards his 
living conditions as he would were he to look on the city as his permanent 
home. He will look on his discomforts as temporary whereas a resident 
will look for ways to improve his condition. For those migrants who were 
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unemployed in Nairobi, 36 per cent planned, to stay in Nairobi for the rest 
of their lives, 64 per cent planned to leavg, and of those unemployed 
almost two years, 27 per cent still chose to remain in Nairobi while 
72 per cent planned to .leave. In the housing categories the proportions 
intending to stay were 35 per cent: in low cost, 47 per cent in temporary 
and 18 per cent in medium cost housing, Implying greater costs to the 
municipality due to higher standard of living expectations. 
(3) Other Costs: There are other social costs related to urban unemployment 
which are difficult to measure and often impossible to quantify. These 
include potential political and social unrest and the formation of more 
permanent groups of unemployed creating the possibility of the up to now 
irremediable "culture of poverty". Potentially these costs may represent 
the heaviest burden to the economy but we are not in a position to measure 
them. When the migrant: makes his decision to migrate, he does so with some 
level of knowledge regarding his employment: potential, and some expectations 
about the preferred type of employment. The probability of frustration and 
unrest will vary directly with the magnitude of the difference between 
expectations and reality, perceived possibilities and the actual situation. 
The likelihood of more permanent unemployment will vary inversely with 
both the individual's skill level and the extent of his options to return 
to his home area or move to some alternative location. 
The dissatisfaction of the unemployed migrants was considered 
but was limited by the available data. The unemployed were asked what they 
thought was the main reason for their unemployment„ Four answers were 
anticipated: (1) too little education; (2) tribal discrimination.; 
(3) government not trying hard enough to create jobs; and (4) trade 
unions only looking out for the welfare of their own members. The 
strongest response was in the first category. Those in the latter three 
groups are more prone to political unrest, if not action, than those who 
see personal skill inadequacy as the cause of their unemployment. The longer 
the migrants remained unemployed, the greater the tendency towards 
di scontent. This question was also broken down by education groups. 
While 45 per cent of those in the primary education group blamed their 
failure to obtain employment on the lack of education, only 31 per cent of 
the secondary students did. Fifty-five per cent of the unemployed, 
with primary education or less could be called discontented while 69 per-
cent of the secondary students were. 
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Summary of Average Costs 
We have measured the average values of those costs which can 
be quantified. The divergence of private from social costs can now be 
more readily seen. The value of production forgone by the Kenya economy for 
the average migrant unemployed 3.5 months is: rural production forgone, 
221 shs.; net urban production forgone, a range of 301 to 707 shs.; 
total production forgone, a range of 525 to 931 shs. Two further costs 
have been quantified for the average migrant: the average cost of the 
move - 11.4 shs., and the cost of urban subsistence - 110 shs. (These may 
be a social cost only if provided by friends or relatives.) Therefore, it 
is possible for private costs of migration to equal 345 shs. while the social 
costs are somewhere within the range of 646 to 1,052 shs. per migrant. 
These values for social costs are to be considered as minimum 
values for a number of reasons. First, such important costs as use of 
urban facilities and the costs associated with political and social 
unrest could not be quantified. Second, those migrants who came to Nairobi 
but returned prior to the survey could not be included in the calculations. 
We hypothesize that these men returned because they could not obtain 
satisfactory employment in Nairobi or because they had above average 
rural income opportunities. In either case, the inclusion of these men 
would have increased the value of social costs. Finally, only actual 
unemployment was considered in the estimates. Since the value to 
society of the output of some of the men who resorted to employment or 
self-employment in the informal sector as a means of subsistence is likely 
to be less than their social cost while in Nairobi, they represent an 
increase in the social cost caused by the inappropriate urban wage. 
Changes in Social and Private Costs 
According to our migration model, the creation of one new job 
above the existing rate of job creation will attract more than one 
additional migrant. Therefore, even if average private and social costs 
of an unemployed migrant: remain constant, an increase in the rural-urban 
expected real income differential will cause increasing social costs for 
the economy in the form of a larger stock of urban unemployed. 
Furthermore, for a given stock of urban unemployed, if the characteristics 
of these unemployed migrants change, then the social cost of this stock 
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of unemployed will change as well. As a result we formulate here a 
series of hypotheses on the likely changes in the costs of migration caused 
by an increase in the rural-urban expected real income differential 
(type "a"), and by a change in the characteristics of the unemployed 
migrants (type "b"). 
1 (a) The cost of the marginal unemployed migrant in terms 
of rural income forgone will increase if the rural-urban income differential 
increases. Some migrants who previously would not migrate, due to in-
sufficient rural-urban wage differential will, with an increased urban 
wage, find sufficient incentive to migrate. This implies that they have a 
higher rural income than the migrants who left previously. This higher rural 
income also increases the migrant's opportunity cost of making the move; so 
a similar effect to that stated above would be realized if this migrant 
perceives an improved probability of obtaining urban employment, even if the 
urban wage has remained constant. 
2 (a) When the incentive to migrate increases, the migrant 
more distant from the urban center or with a less common cultural 
heritage will migrate and thus increase the private cost of migration. 
2 (b) The financial cost of moving per migrant increases if 
he takes his family with him but this increased financial cost may be 
offset by a reduced psychological cost in the form of increased security. 
3 (a) The private costs of urban subsistence and job 
search increase as more migrants are induced into the urban areas by 
an increased rural-urban real income differential. Since increased 
incentives were necessary to induce migration, these individuals will be 
more likely to have to bear the costs of their own subsistence. The 
increased stock of unemployed migrants means that the individual will 
have less ability to receive aid from relatives or friends who are 
experiencing inceasing demands. At the same time the cost of subsistence 
may increase as a result of the pressure from increased demand. 
3 (b) Higher education of the unemployed implies greater 
private costs since their expectation of urban living standards will 
be higher that that of the migrants of previous times who, with less 
education, had fewer material wants. 
4- (a) Urban production forgone will increase If increased 
migration is induced by an increase in urban wages but will, remain the 
same if induced by increased job opportunities. » 
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u (b") Because opportunities for high wage employment for 
the better educated are much better in urban centers than in rural 
areas, the gap between rural and urban productivity will tend to 
increase as the level of education provided increases. 
5 (a) An increase in social costs will result, from the 
heavier demands being made on existing urban facilities by increased 
numbers of migrants. Higher urban densities will increase the discomfort 
of all and will induce government efforts to provide more facilities. 
5 (b) With an increase In the level of education, expectations 
with reference to living conditions and amenity will increase. Therefore, 
over time the social cost of unemployment will increase. 
6 (a) With higher- levels of unemployment, more people will 
experience the frustration of unemployment The marginal unemployed 
migrant will be more prone to join a group which has negative political 
implications because larger numbers of unemployed make .-ommunication easier 
and such a group more powerful and, therefore, more likely to survive. 
6 (b) A change in the composition of the unemployed over 
time will result in increased political and social unrest. The unemployed 
will now be better educated and will be less likely to blame themselves 
for their inability to find jobs but rather will blame government, trade 
unions and the business firms. 
Since we lack a sufficient time span over which to observe 
any trend in costs, if Is not possible to quantify changes in private and 
social costs. It would appear though that the costs of migration are 
likely to increase in the immediate future. The Kenya government has made 
a strong commitment to promote rural development but rural-urban wage 
differentials are still increasing. Also, the government has placed 
great emphasis on increasing the levels of education of its rural 
population. As a result, the general level of educational achievement in 
the labour force h^s risen in Kenya and continues to do so Finally, 
with increased levels of income In the urban centers, more mairied men 
will be able to afford to bring +heir families with them, which increases 
the costs per migrant. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION CONTROL 
For the purpose of this paper we take as given both the 
existence of an urban unemployment, problem and the need during the 
process of economic development for a transfer of labour resources 
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from agricultural to non-agricultural activity. For example, in Kenya 
during the time of our survey, the pronouncements of some public officials, 
the debate in the Kenyan Parliament and the statements of some social 
scientists led one to believe that Kenya was beset with an urban 
unemployment problem bordering on crisis proportions. Although It was 
not clear which of the above mentioned costs concerned the politicians 
and social scientists most, it was clear that the magnitude of these 
costs was sufficient to warrant serious consideration of various means 
of controlling the net: flow of labour into urban centers. However, 
given Kenya's desire for economic development, a certain amount of 
rural-to-urban shift in population is essential; so the questions before 
us are: when should this shift in the spatial location of the population 
take place and what measures should be adopted to control the flow of 
migrants. 
For the Councillors of Nairobi the obvious and most desirable 
solution is not to control rural-urban migration but to introduce measures 
to ensure jobs and housing for the unemployed. Such measures would 
benefit the city both by removing the disadvantages of the existence of 
unemployed migrants as well as by stepping up economic activity in 
the city. This will not provide a solution to the problem, however, 
because of the immense task involved in providing housing and jobs for 
15 to 20 per cent of the labour force (5, p. 6; 22, p. 5). Even this 
accomplishment would not provide a solution because the provision of 
more jobs and more housing will only induce further migration. An 
experiment in 1964 (and later- in 1970), designed to increase urban 
jobs and reduce unemployment had only a temporary effect, contributing 
more to raising expectations for the rural reserve army of potential 
migrants than to realizing them (10, pp. 529-543). 
An alternative approach to resolving the urban unemployment 
problem would be a subsidy to industry of sufficient magnitude to cover 
the opportunity cost of the urban job (prevailing wage minus the value 
of the output of an additional job). In this way industry can be 
induced to. hire more labour. Given the migration decision-making 
mechanism utilized here, Harris and Todaro have shown that such a wage 
subsidy will not improve overall welfare without some restriction of 
migration in-flow (9, p. 137). 
Therefore, a third, option is to control the urban in-flow 
either in conjunction with an urban industry wage subsidy as proposed 
by Harris and Todaro or as_ an independent strategy. The Kenya government 
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is pursuing such a policy in an indirect manner in the form of moral suasion 
by President: Kenyatta calling on the urban unemployed to return to their 
land and in the form of "anti-vagrancy" legislation which empowers the 
Courts to order some urban unemployed back to their home area- Although 
such a policy may well be beneficial to the Kenyan economy in the short-
run. , given a minimum average social cost per unemployed migrant in the 
range of 64-6 to 1,852 shs, , it is not in the economic self-interest of 
the individual migrant who has a sufficiently high probability of 
purchasing a higher urban income stream at an approximate average cost 
of 34-5 shs. Furthermore, such action would redistribute income in favour 
c 
of the already wealthier urban centres, Over time the total economy would 
lose as well since the marginally employed would merely be forced to 
remain in the rural areas, which would serve to dampen development efforts 
in these areas. 
The difficulty with these three proposed solutions is that 
they are designed to counter the symptoms, expressed in the form of mounting 
social costs, rather than the causes of the problem. Although Harris and 
Todaro explicitly recognize the inappropriate urban wage as the cause of the 
problem, they assume it is legislatively determined and thus do not consider 
the determinants of the rural-urban wage differential. 
The persistent rural-urban wage differential is a function of 
three major factors. First, the inherited colonial wage structure, the 
need to employ expatriates since Independence and the international 
mobility of some groups have served to ensure international levels of 
remuneration for some of the employees in the major urban centers. The 
presence of international companies in large numbers aggravates the 
situation. Second, government policies with reference to Import 
substitution, trade licensing and minimum wages have encouraged a choice of 
technology which results in a relatively small, high-productivity, high-
wage labour force in the major urban centers. Third, productivity in the 
rural areas has not increased at a sufficient rate to keep pace with the 
productivity increase of the employed in the urban areas. In some rural 
areas the population pressure on the land is too severe to enable the 
6. Harris and Todaro demonstrate that the rural areas will suffer a 
net welfare loss from migration control policies if the price elasticity 
of demand for the rural output is less than one. 
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absorption of a rapidly growing labour force in production characterized 
7 
by rapid growth in labour productivity.' In other rural areas where 
out-migration has exceeded labour force growth, the remaining population 
has lacked the ability to adapt to an alternative, more productive set 8 of production techniques. 
Therefore, the fourth and, in our opinion, preferred option 
Is to recognize the causes of the rural-urban wage differential and to 
remedy these causes. For the Kenya government this will involve a 
re-examination of its industrial strategy as well as increased rural 
development efforts. By integrating the rural economy into the total 
economy and thus enabling the rural population to respond to new market 
opportunities with new production techniques, it will serve over time to 
reduce the rural-urban wage differential and enable the Kenya economy to 
realize the welfare optimum possible under a competitive wage in a 
properly functioning market. Such a rural development strategy would 
include education and training designed to enable the rural population 
to develop and. absorb new technology, furthering development of 
transportation and marketing systems to integrate the total economy and 
developing a number of growth centers throughout Kenya. 
On the basis of a comparison of the 1962 and the 1969 
Census, the inflow of adult population into Nairobi was estimated to be 
9 
90,800. If each of these men experienced 3.5 months of unemployment on 
arrival in Nairobi, then, on the basis of our average social cost per 
migrant the annual cost to the Kenya economy of this growth in the Nairobi 
labour force was in the approximate range of K£4-18 ,977 to K£682 ,297. 
For 1964- these values represent from .13 to .21 per cent of Kenya's 
Gross Domestic Product. Therefore, a considerable reduction of social 
cost can be purchased with some expenditure in rural development. 
The opportunity cost of creating a rural job which induces one unemployed 
7. Evidence collected In several rural areas indicates that the 
parents who cannot provide land for their children have channelled the 
available investment funds into education as a means of enabling their children 
to seek employment in the towns and cities (17, 8), 
8. The elements of this inability in rural areas to adapt to 
changing land-labour ratios has been developed by Koo (14). 
9. The estimate was based on the difference between the 1969 
African male population (Census, Vol. II, Table 3) and the 1962 African 
male population (Census,Vol. I and II, p. 36). The difference was then 
multiplied by the proportion of total African male population, age 20 
years and older, according to the 1969 Census (Vol.Ill, Table I). 
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migrant in Nairobi to return to bis home area is the value of the new 
output of that migrant since his output forgone in Nairobi is zero. This 
approach to the problem will reduce the social cost of migration without 
jeopardizing the benefits to be derived from rural-urban migration. 
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APPENDIX 
The Survey of Rural-Urban Migration in Kenya* 
The costs of migrant unemployment are based on data taken 
from the questionnaires given to a representative sample in Nairobi and 
Nairobi Extra-Provincial District In 1968. The sample was made up of 
African males who had migrated to Nairobi between 1964 and 1968 and who 
had come from either another urban center or a rural village for the 
purpose of finding employment. |~No attempt was made to Interview either 
those migrants who had chosen not to migrate or those migrants who had 
returned to their place of origin. In order to obtain a random sample 
a set of buildings were selected using a table of random numbers in 
each of the six housing categories in Nairobi according to the 
distribution of the total population. (information regarding migrant 
distribution was not available.) Fifty-seven questions were asked of 
the migrants by University of Nairobi students. The information obtained 
includes the length of unemployment of each migrant before acquiring a 
first job; a measure of their productive potential based on (l) their 
previous rural employment, (2) their level of education, and (3) their 
vocational training as it compares to those already productively employed; 
the types of housing they live in; and the political attitudes they express. 
* A complete description of the Survey and methodology will be 
found in Henry Rempel, "Rural-to-Urban Labour Migration: An Interim 
Report," Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, Staff Paper No. 39, 
(August, 1968). 
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